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Transcendental Arguments for a Categorical Imperative as Arguments from Agential 
Self-Understanding 
 
Deryck Beyleveld 
 
Abstract 
 
This chapter construes Kant’s contention that a categorical imperative is a synthetic a priori 
principle as equivalent to Gewirth’s claim that such an imperative is a dialectically necessary 
principle (a strict requirement of agential self-understanding). It is not concerned to defend 
either Kant’s or Gewirth’s argument for a categorical imperative, but to elucidate the 
“dialectically necessary method” (which rests on the dialectical necessity of a principle 
making it categorically binding) and to defend this method against David Enoch’s critique of 
“constitutivism” (taken as trying to show that transcendental arguments for morality, 
construed as dialectically necessary ones, are futile, even if they can be successful, because 
normativity cannot be constituted in dialectical necessity). In the process, it relates the 
dialectically necessary method to internalism, naturalism, foundationalism, coherentism, and 
realism. 
 
Introduction 
 
According to Kant,1 if “a categorical imperative exists, it must already be connected 
(completely a priori) with the concept of the will of a rational being as such” (GW 4:427) 
without being contained within this concept (GW 4:420). So, proving that it exists requires a 
“synthetic use of pure practical reason” (GW 4:445), making it a synthetic a priori principle 
(GW 4:440; C2 5:31; 5:46). 
It is generally presumed that Kant’s synthetic a priori propositions require 
transcendental arguments for their justification. It is, however, debatable what Kant thinks a 
transcendental argument for a practical principle is. A very popular view is that, in C2, Kant 
reverses (and retreats from) his GW claim that agents are bound by the moral law (a 
categorical imperative [CI] for human agents, who are affected by heteronomous incentives) 
because they necessarily presuppose that they have freewill (FW), by holding that the moral 
law is given to agents as the sole fact of pure reason, thus providing a different account of 
what makes it a synthetic a priori principle.2 In my opinion, this is a mistake: Kant never 
abandons his GW view that a maxim M is constituted as a CI by its acceptance being a strict 
requirement of agential self-understanding (by the fact that a human agent, call her “Agnes”, 
misunderstands what it is for her to be an agent, and denies implicitly that she is an agent, by 
denying that she unconditionally ought to comply with M). In Alan Gewirth’s (1978) terms, 
the CI is justified by showing that M is dialectically necessary for Agnes.3 
                                                          
1 I refer to Kant’s works on the basis of the Academy edition of the Gesammelte Schriften (Kant 1990sqq), 
stating volume and page number. Translations are those of the Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel 
Kant (Kant 1995sqq). I use the abbreviation GW for Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, C2 for Critique 
of Practical Reason, and C3 for Critique of the Power of Judgment. 
2 Seminally, Dieter Henrich (1960). Pauline Kleingeld (2002, p. 60–61) provides a brief overview of retreatist 
positions. 
3 E.g., Onora O’Neill (2002) and Pauline Kleingeld (2010) also think that Kant does not retreat from his GW 
position. O’Neill, however, thinks that Kant’s appeal to the fact of reason in C2 offers no justification for the 
moral law, serving a different aim, which contrasts with my view that “the fact of reason” is just another way of 
stating his position in GW. Kleingeld’s view is similar to mine on the issue of ‘retreat’ without using Gewirthian 
terminology, but is less expansive, and views the issue of ‘reversal’ differently. 
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I will offer reasons for this opinion; but my primary aims are to elucidate the 
dialectically necessary method (DNM), by outlining Gewirth’s argument for his Principle of 
Generic Consistency (PGC),4 and by construing Kant’s reasoning for the CI in the guise of 
the Formula of Humanity (FoH)5 and the Formula of Universal Law (FUL) in its terms;6 and 
then to defend the DNM against David Enoch’s (2006) critique of “constitutivism”, which he 
attributes primarily to Christine Korsgaard7 and David Velleman,8 but also to Gewirth. 
 
The DNM9 
 
The DNM’s Rationale and Criteria 
 
The DNM presupposes that only agents—those able (because of their capacities for reason 
and understanding) to pursue means voluntarily for their chosen purposes and disposed to do 
so—are intelligibly addressors or addressees of practical precepts of any kind concerning the 
permissibility of their behaviour, and that simply by virtue of having capacities for reason 
and understanding, Agnes cannot evade the question of what, if anything, she may do/ought 
to do. Thus, the question necessarily arises for Agnes of the possibility of a CI (a maxim that 
reason requires her to comply with regardless of anything only contingently related to her), 
which is equivalent to the question of the possibility of purposes that reason requires Agnes 
to regard as ends in themselves. 
In effect, the DNM construes Kant’s assertion that a CI is connected completely a 
priori with the concept of the will of a rational being as such but not contained in it, as the 
view that a CI is a maxim M that is dialectically necessary for Agnes (A) to accept, an M of 
which it is true that {AM}(A).
10 
{AM}(A) →11 “Agnes categorically ought to comply with M” because {AM}(A) → “If 
Agnes denies that she ought to comply with M then she simultaneously implies that she is not 
an agent (by misunderstanding what it is for her to be an agent) and that she is an agent 
(because she presupposes that she is an agent in making any claim about what she may 
do/ought to do)”. So, the only coherent attitude Agnes can have towards M is that she 
unconditionally ought to comply with it, and the DNM’s criterion for rationally permissible 
action (CRA) is: “It is only rational for an agent to act in accord with a maxim if doing so 
complies with the agent’s dialectically necessary commitments”. 
Correlatively, the DNM’s criterion to establish a CI (CDNM) is: “Agnes must accept, 
and may only accept, her dialectically necessary commitments”. 
                                                          
4 The PGC requires Agnes to grant all agents positive and negative rights (GR) to generic conditions of agency 
(GCAs). A GCA is something Agnes needs to be able to even try to act (something the absence of which has a 
negative effect, either immediately or if prolonged, on her ability to act at all) or to have any general chances of 
success in achieving her purposes, regardless of what her purposes are or might be. GR are rights under the 
will-conception (meaning that Agnes can release other agents from their duties to her under her GR). Further 
specification is unnecessary here. 
5 “So act that you use humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, always at the same 
time as an end, never merely as a means” (GW 4:429). 
6 “[A]ct only in accordance with that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it become a 
universal law” (GW 4:421). 
7 Specifically, claims made in Korsgaard (2002). 
8 E.g., Velleman (2004). I will not consider Korsgaard’s and Velleman’s positions. 
9 My elucidation of the DNM builds on Beyleveld (1991), which received Gewirth’s endorsement (Gewirth 
1991), and Beyleveld (2013) and Beyleveld (2016) in particular. 
10 “AM” = “Agnes ought to comply with M”. Placing AM in face brackets signifies that AM is dialectically 
necessary, with the subscripted suffix (A) signifying that it is for Agnes that AM is dialectically necessary. 
11 “→” = “entails”. 
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The DNM is conducted entirely within Agnes’ first-person dialectically necessary 
viewpoint. This does not mean that Agnes may not refer to any other agent (say, Brian) or 
consider what he might think or do; merely that, in judging her dialectically necessary 
commitments, she may (and must) do so only if this is dialectically necessary for her. 
 
The Gewirthian Argument for the PGC 
 
The PGC is dialectically necessary for Agnes, = {PGC}(A), if 
 
1 The Principle of Hypothetical Imperatives (PHI), “If having X (or doing X) is 
necessary for Agnes to pursue or achieve E, then Agnes ought to act to secure having 
X (or do X) or give up pursuit of E”, is dialectically necessary for Agnes, = {PHI}(A). 
2 There are GCAs. 
3 Dialectically necessary commitments are (i) distributively universal (i.e., “It is 
dialectically necessary for Agnes to hold that she ought to do or have X” = {AoX}(A), 
→ “It is dialectically necessary for Brian to hold that he ought to do or have X” = 
{BoX}(B)), which is uncontroversial; and (ii) collectively universal (i.e., {AoX}(A) → 
{BoX}(A)), which is highly contested. 
 
1 coupled with 2 → 
 
4  “It is dialectically necessary for Agnes to hold that she ought to defend having the 
GCAs (AoA), unless she is willing to accept generic damage to her ability to act (A)” 
= {AoAA}(A).  
 
4 coupled with 3 →  
 
5a (by distributive universalisation) “It is dialectically necessary for Brian to hold that he 
ought to defend having the GCAs, unless he is willing to accept generic damage to his 
ability to act” = {BoBB}(B) and  
5b (by collective universalisation) “It is dialectically necessary for Agnes to consider that 
she ought to defend Brian’s having the GCAs, unless he is willing to accept generic 
damage to his ability to act” = {AoBB}(A),  
6 {Brian has the GR}(A) = {BGR}(A), which → 
7 {AGR}(A), because {AoB
B  BGR}(A) → {AoAA  AGR}(A). 
 
6 coupled with 7 → 
 
8 {PGC}(A), → 
9 {PGC}(A&B) (by distributive universalisation).. 
 
Gewirth’s own argument for 3(ii), the “Argument from the Sufficiency of Agency” 
(Gewirth 1978, p. 110), is as follows: 7: {AGR}(A) → 7a: {“Agnes is an agent” → 
“AGR”}(A). This is because, if Agnes denies “Agnes is an agent” → “AGR”, she holds 
“AGR” → “Agnes has a property D that she does not necessarily possess as an agent”, so 
holds that if she does not have D then she may not hold “AGR”. But then she violates the 
CDNM by holding something not permitted by 7. Ergo, she must deny that having D is 
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necessary for AGR, and so accept 7a. But 7a → 7b: {“Brian is an agent” → “BGR”}(A). So, 
{AGR}(A) → {BGR}(A). Ergo, 3(ii): {AoX}(A) → {BoX}(A).12 
 
Alternatively: 
 
i. Suppose {AoX}(A).  
ii. To comply with AoX, Agnes needs Brian not to interfere with, and when she is 
unable to do so by her own unaided efforts, to defend her compliance. So, 
iii. {AoX}(A) → {Brian ought to act in accord with AoX}(A), = {BocAoX}(A). 
iv. {AoX}(A) → {BoX}(B). So {{BoX}(B)}(A).  
v. By the CRA, iii is intelligible only if Brian can accept BocAoX without implying that 
he is not an agent  only if BocAoX does not require him to act contrary to BoX. So, 
vi  {AoX}(A) → {“ BocAoX” iff “BoX”}(A). Ergo, 
3(ii)  {AoX}(A) → {BoX}(A). 
 
This has the advantage that nothing specific needs to be shown to be dialectically 
necessary to show that dialectically necessary commitments are collectively universal.13 
So, in essence, the Gewirthian argument is: As an agent, Agnes is necessarily 
confronted with the idea of a CI. If she fully understands this idea (and it is dialectically 
necessary for her to do so), she will accept that there is a CI: “Agnes ought to act only in 
accord with a maxim that does not conflict with her dialectically necessary commitments”. 
Then, given (3), the CI is: “All agents ought to act only in accord with a maxim that 
does not require action contrary to any agent’s dialectically necessary commitments”. 
This is not empty. Given also that there are GCAs, {PHI}(A&B) renders it dialectically 
necessary for all agents to respect every agent’s need for the GCAs..  
 
Kant and the DNM 
 
That Kant holds the moral law to be dialectically necessary in GW is plausible. Given his 
view that FW and the moral law are reciprocal (GW 4:447; C2 5:29) and that the CI is the 
form in which the moral law appears to human agents (GW 4:454), his contention that agents 
necessarily suppose that they have FW (hence necessarily suppose that the moral law applies 
to them) as the only idea under which they can act (as the only condition under which they 
can understand themselves as acting) (GW 4:448) is readily construed in this way. This is 
supported by his view that a synthetic a priori proposition is one in which two cognitions are 
bound together by their connection with a third in which they are both to be found (GW 
4:447), because he identifies this third cognition with the positive concept of freedom (GW 
4:447), which is produced by agents recognising that they belong to the world of 
understanding (GW 4:452). 
My view, that Kant never departs from holding that the moral law is dialectically 
necessary, is that to say that the moral law is given as the fact of reason (C2 5:31) is to say 
that the moral law is dialectically necessary.14 
As I see it, Kant’s transcendental argument for the moral law, in both GW and C2, has 
two phases: 
                                                          
12 This argument makes dialectical necessity the ratio cognoscendi of the moral law and agency the ratio 
essendi of the moral law. 
13 A third argument is presented in Beyleveld 2013, p. 218–219. I consider that all three arguments entail each 
other. 
14 If so, Pauline Kleingeld (2010, p. 65) is right that the fact of reason “is the product of reason’s own activity”. 
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Ph 1: By virtue of being an agent, the question of the possibility of a CI/the moral law/pure 
reason being practical necessarily arises for Agnes. As such, she is necessarily 
presented with the reciprocal concepts of a CI/pure practical reason/the moral law (in 
consequence of which she is presented with the concept of FW).15 However, if she 
understands these concepts, she must accept that there is a CI, “Comply with a CI!” 
and understanding the concept of a CI also requires her to accept that it takes the form 
of the FUL/FoH. Since she must have the concept of a CI in order to understand what 
it is to be an agent, it is dialectically necessary for her to accept the FUL/FoH. 
Ph 2:  Nevertheless, the concept of a CI is a delusion if the idea that Agnes has FW is 
incompatible with the synthetic a priori proposition that every event has a cause. 
However, no incompatibility exists, and because the dialectical necessity of FW (in 
being the ratio essendi for the CI) gives content to an idea of freedom that even 
speculative reason must presuppose, the CI is not a mere idea of pure reason but has 
objective reality for practical purposes.  
 
To the contrary, “retreatists” contend: 
 
R1  In GW Kant holds that FW is the ratio cognoscendi of the moral law. But in C2 he 
claims that the moral law is the ratio cognoscendi of FW, with FW being the ratio 
essendi of the moral law. 
R2  Consequently, he abandons his GW claim that the moral law can be given a morally 
neutral foundation. It is only possible to show that those who accept that there is a CI 
must hold the CI to be the FUL/FoH. But, because it is generally accepted that there is 
a CI, the question of its existence does not arise in ordinary practical human 
discourse. To say that the moral law is given as the fact of reason is to say that the 
question of the existence of a CI does not arise in everyday practical dealings. 
 
Proving my construction is beyond the scope of this chapter:16 although I will offer 
reasons for it, the point of doing so is to show how Kant might be construed as consistently 
employing the DNM, which will assist me to further elucidate the DNM. 
What then are my reasons for my construction? For a start, R1 and R2 contradict 
Kant’s statement that C2 presupposes GW insofar as GW “provides and justifies a 
determinate formula” of the moral law (C2 5:8) in echo of GW being “nothing more that the 
search for and establishment of the supreme principle of morality” (GW 4:392). This places 
the burden of proof squarely on retreatists, requiring them to provide evidence for their view 
sufficient to convict Kant of amnesia, self-incomprehension, or disingenuousness, while non-
retreatists need only show that it is not wholly implausible to attribute their view to him. 
Regarding R1, there are least two reasons to think that Kant always held FW to be the 
ratio essendi of the moral law. 
First, he says that, because a CI must be an a priori proposition (GW 4:419-420), the 
task of GW is not to “establish” it but “merely to explain it” (GW 4:420), and concludes that 
FW is the only presupposition under which the moral law can apply (GW 4:461), which is to 
conclude that it is the ratio essendi of the moral law. 
                                                          
15 Due to this reciprocality, nothing hinges on the fact that, in GW, Kant reasons from the concept of pure reason 
to FW to the moral law, whereas in C2 he reasons from the concept of pure reason to the moral law to FW. 
Compare Kleingeld (2010, p. 70). 
16 I intend to do so in a future paper. 
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Second, the deduction in GW is “of the concept of freedom from pure practical 
reason” (GW 4:448), which echoes “Pure reason is practical of itself alone” and gives agents 
the moral law (C2 5:31). The GW statement explains why, having apparently claimed that the 
moral law is dialectically necessary for Agnes because it is dialectically necessary for her to 
hold that she has FW, Kant thinks that there might be a circle in his justification of the moral 
law (GW 449–450). It also explains why he thinks that the circle is not genuine. The 
dialectical necessity of the concept of FW for Agnes is established by the dialectical necessity 
of the concept of pure practical reason (inherent in her understanding that the question of the 
possibility of a CI is necessarily raised for her by her possession of reason and 
understanding), from which it follows that Agnes must accept that there is a CI. There is no 
circle because showing the dialectical necessity of the concept of a CI does not require the 
existence of a CI to be assumed. 
Regarding R2:  
 
(i) To hold that the moral law is the ratio cognoscendi of FW (C2 5:4) does not preclude 
the moral law’s justification being its dialectical necessity. Note then that Kant does 
not treat “moral consciousness”, the “fact of reason” (C2 5:31), as a given. It is 
rendered possible by a process of abstraction and mental unification (C2 5:30) that 
can be linked to the processes cited in GW 4:452, 457 and, see below, C3 5:293–295. 
(ii) Taking the “common human understanding” to be what ordinary persons take for 
granted does not square with Kant’s contempt for treating widespread acceptance as 
the yardstick for philosophical claims (GW 4:409–410), nor with his explicit 
repudiation of the fact of reason being an empirical fact (C2 5:31), nor with his 
insistence that “the moral law is given … as a fact of pure reason of which we are a 
priori conscious and which is apodictically certain” and “stands of itself altogether a 
priori and independently of empirical principles” (C2 5:47). 
Instead, I think Kant’s references to “the common human understanding” are 
to the “sensus communis”, an a priori faculty of judging “that in its reflection takes 
account (a priori) of everyone else’s way of representing in thought” (C3 5:293), 
which has three maxims—yielded by exercising the cognitive powers that are “the 
least that can be expected from anyone who lays claim to the name of a human being” 
(C3 5:293) (those minimal capacities necessary to possess awareness of one’s 
existence), which comprise “understanding”, “power of judgment”, and “reason” (C3 
5:197-198). These maxims, which appear as early as Kant’s Logic (9:57) are: 
:  
To think for oneself; 2. To think in the position of everyone else; 3. Always to 
think in accord with oneself. (C3 5:294) … [T]he first of these maxims is the 
maxim of the understanding, the second that of the power of judgment, the 
third that of reason … [which can be achieved only] through the combination 
of the first two [maxims]. (C3 5:295) 
  
I suggest that, applied to practical reason, the maxim of understanding directs 
Agnes to comply with any maxims she must adopt in order to think of herself as the 
particular agent she is (with any maxims that are dialectically necessary for her) 
(which, applied to GW 4:437–438, requires her to consider humanity in her person to 
be an end in itself). However, the power of reflective judgment requires Agnes to 
recognise that she cannot be the particular agent she is without being an agent (C3 
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20:211).17 So, not only is Brian required to comply with any maxims that are 
dialectically necessary for him (thus, to consider his humanity to be an end in itself), 
but Agnes must also comply with any maxims that are dialectically necessary for 
Brian (hence Agnes must consider that Brian’s humanity is also an end in itself). The 
power of reflective judgment generates the maxim of judgment, which requires Agnes 
to set herself apart from the subjective private conditions of her thinking (involved in 
exercising her power of understanding) by reflecting from a universal standpoint, 
which she can only do by adopting the standpoint of others (C3 5:295). Reason 
(requiring her cognitive faculties to operate coherently) then permits Agnes to adopt a 
maxim for herself only if this is consistent with maxims that are dialectically 
necessary for any agent (entailing that Agnes ought to comply with the maxim that 
every agent’s humanity is an end in itself). 
So interpreted, the maxim of reason amounts to the FUL/FoH justified as 
dialectically necessary for Agnes. 
(iii) Kant does say that “the objective reality of the moral law cannot be proved by any 
deduction”; but this is any deduction “by any efforts of theoretical reason” (C2 5:47). 
Also, while he does offer an argument for the moral law “fully sufficient to take the 
place of any a priori justification” (C2 5:48), if he is not to be contradicting himself, 
we must, again, read this as “any a priori justification from the possibility of 
theoretical knowledge”, because it is that the moral law “is itself laid down as a 
principle of the deduction [my emphasis] of freedom as a causality of pure reason” 
that gives a positive determination to the idea of freedom that speculative reason 
needs to presuppose for itself (C2 5:48), which echoes his assertion that the 
presupposition of FW is not only compatible with “the principle of natural necessity”, 
but “necessary in idea” for a being conscious of his causality through reason (GW 
4:461). 
(iv) Kant says (consistently with the DNM) that understanding the idea of a CI commits 
agents to accept that there is a CI when he says that the apodictic nature of the moral 
law is contained in its problematic nature (C2 5:31), and when he draws an analogy 
between his argument for the moral law and the ontological argument for the 
existence of God (C2 5:105).  
(v) The retreatist idea of the fact of reason does not fit Kant’s “three-term” depiction of a 
synthetic a priori principle in general in C3 5:197, which corresponds to that given in 
GW. 
 
My construal implies that, in GW, phase 1 of Kant’s argument is already completed 
before GW III, which carries out phase 2. Note that Kant only refers to a “deduction” in 
connection with phase 2, in both GW and C2. So, we might say that phase 2 is the deduction 
part of his transcendental argument and phase 1 the elicitation part. The latter part involves 
not only specifying the CI on the assumption of it (which is analytic), but the claim that the 
CI is dialectically necessary as well. In line with this, I consider that when Kant says that 
“rational nature exists as an end in itself” is the ground of the CI (GW 4:428–429), he claims 
that to act rationally is an end in itself on the criterion of the DNM’s CRA, and he is actually 
saying that pure reason (on the basis of the CDNM) produces the moral law, that the moral 
law is given as the fact of reason. 
                                                          
17 As against, the “determining” power of judgment, which requires her to recognise that she can only be an 
agent if she is the particular agent that she is. 
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The central differences between Kant and Gewirth derive (see Beyleveld 2016a) from 
Gewirth’s claim that {PHI}(A), which implies that the moral law is grounded in dubiety about 
both FW and determinism, versus Kant’s claim that the moral law and FW are reciprocal 
ideas. Consequently, Gewirthians (versus Kant) eschew the existence of perfect duties to self 
under the CI, and regard the essence of being an agent, not as possessing FW, but in being 
subject to existential anxiety (hope-fear) regarding all metaphysical matters. The Gewirthian 
argument does not require a phase 2 because the place of {PHI}(A) in it prevents the issue of 
the dialectic of reason that prompts Kant’s phase 2 from arising. 
 
The DNM and Enoch’s Critique of “Constitutivism” 
 
Enoch’s Critique 
 
David Enoch (2006) attacks “constitutivism”, which holds that 
 
(a) “normative standards relevant for actions … fall out of an understanding of what is 
constitutive of action” (Enoch 2006, p. 170); or  
(b)  normativity is grounded “in what is constitutive of action” (Enoch 2006, p. 170)]; or 
(c)  there are specific aims, desires or motives that are constitutive of agency (Enoch 
2006, p. 173, p. 175); or 
(d) the dialectical necessity of a principle renders its “ought” categorically binding on 
agents (Enoch 2006, p. 189 n. 42).  
 
Enoch treats (a)–(d) as equivalent, implying that constitutivists hold the thesis (CT): 
“Supposing that {AoX}(A), Agnes is an agent only if, per (c), she complies with AoX and, per 
(b), considers that she ought to, and this is why {AoX}(A) renders AoX categorically binding 
on her”. 
He attributes the following objectives to constitutivists: 
 
addressing the sceptic, accommodating externalist18 intuitions consistently with 
internalism,19 and coming up with a naturalist theory that is immune to the … open 
question argument.20 (Enoch 2006, p. 177) 
 
Suppose {AoX}(A).
21 According to Enoch, CT is untenable because Agnes might not 
care whether she is an agent rather than a shmagent (someone unlike an agent only in not 
having AoX-compliant purposes/not accepting AoX). So, to show that AoX is categorically 
binding on Agnes, she must be given a reason (independent of the DNM) why she ought to be 
an agent rather than a shmagent/why she ought to care whether or not she understands what it 
is for her to be an agent (Enoch 2006, p. 179). Consequently, constitutivism cannot cope with 
the anti-naturalist challenge (Enoch 2006, p. 193). 
                                                          
18 “[E]xternalists insist that one’s normative reasons do not depend on one’s desires, that such dependence is 
already objectionable unless the desires have something normative going for them” (Enoch 2006, p. 193). 
19 “Internalism” involves the proposition “that it is necessary for one’s having a [justificatory] reason to act in a 
certain way that one be motivated—perhaps under suitable conditions—to act in that way” (Enoch 2006, p. 
173). I call this thesis (which derives from David Hume) “narrow internalism”.  
20 This alleges that “normative judgments cannot be reduced to descriptive ones because any such reduction will 
lose the very normativity it was supposed to capture” (Enoch 2006, p. 174). 
21 Enoch is not concerned with whether or not {AoX}(A) is true, but only with what the significance of its truth 
would be. 
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Enoch’s objection is akin to the claim made by Millard Shumaker (1979) that 
{PGC}(A) does not give Agnes a categorical reason to comply with the PGC unless the “pain 
of contradiction” incurred by non-compliance will necessarily deter her from acting contrary 
to the PGC. Shumaker contends that Agnes’ dialectically commitments cannot do the work 
the DNM assigns to them because they do not necessarily give her narrow internalist reasons 
to act. Since Enoch links the DNM to narrow internalism, he should agree that Shumaker’s 
point is well taken, as this explains his claim that CT implies the false proposition that 
making Agnes understand what it is for her to be an agent will make her comply with AoX 
(Enoch 2006, p. 171).22 But Enoch’s intention is to show that the required independent reason 
must be a robust realist (externalist) one.  
Anyway, CT is ridiculous because it entails that it is impossible for Agnes to act 
irrationally,23 which runs counter to the thesis that “‘ought’ implies both ‘able to do’ and 
‘able to not do’”. But, happily, Enoch’s critique is misdirected at the DNM, which does not 
implicate CT, and eschews narrow internalism without being committed to robust realism. 
 
Refuting Enoch’s Critique 
 
None of Enoch’s characterisations of “constitutivism” are equivalent to each other; but I am 
only concerned to show that the DNM does not involve CT. 
Per the DNM, Agnes’ required acceptance of AoX falls out of her understanding 
what constitutes understanding her agency, not as per Enoch’s characterisation (a), that AoX 
falls out of her understanding what constitutes action/agency. This is not a distinction 
without a difference. First, {AoX}(A) does not ground AoX itself, but “Agnes ought to accept 
AoX”. Secondly, that Agnes ought to accept AoX, is not revealed by appreciating what is 
contained in the concept of action/agency, but by Agnes appreciating what is required for her 
to understand what it is for her to be an agent. {AoX}(A) does not imply that AoX is a 
necessary truth (analytic) nor that AoX or its acceptance is contained in the concept of being 
an agent. What it shows to be analytically contained in the concept of being an agent is that 
Agnes only fully possesses agential self-understanding if she accepts AoX, not that she is an 
agent only if she accepts AoX. This contrast between analyticity and dialectical necessity 
accords with Kant’s depiction of a synthetic a priori practical principle, in which agential 
self-understanding is the third term that links the idea of Agnes as the particular agent she is 
to the CI, as against an analytic principle that links the idea of Agnes as the particular agent 
she is directly to the CI. 
Not grasping this distinction leads Enoch to attack a strawman. Worse, his attack is 
unintelligible if directed at the genuine DNM. Given {AoX}(A), his contention that Agnes 
may evade acceptance of AoX by claiming to be a shmagent rather than an agent is only 
intelligible on the premise that (as the result of the DNM) Agnes is an agent only if she 
accepts AoX/has AoX-compliant purposes, and a shmagent if she does not accept AoX/does 
not have AoX-compliant purposes. But, per the DNM, agents are those able and willing to 
pursue purposes voluntarily, regardless of what those purposes are or might be. Establishing 
{AoX}(A) does not miraculously alter this definition. It reveals that agents, as beings willing 
                                                          
22 Enoch links this criticism to David Lewis (2000, p. 60), who views “constitutivism” as implying that 
“philosophy can replace the hangman”. Cf. Robert Nozick’s lurid claim that Gewirth displays commitment to 
“philosophy as a coercive activity” guided by the objective of producing “arguments so powerful they set up 
reverberations in the brain: if the person refuses to accept the conclusion, he dies” (Nozick 1981, p. 4), and 
Jeffrey Reiman, who says that an agent’s dialectically necessary normative judgments are “a kind of compulsion 
that grabs hold of the reasoning faculties of a prospective agent” (Reiman 1990, p. 62). 
23 Not merely, as Enoch (2006, p. 178 n. 22) suggests, difficult to see how she can act irrationally. 
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and able to pursue purposes voluntarily, ought to accept (= it is dialectically necessary for 
them to accept) only AoX-compliant purposes. 
So, given {AoX}(A), it is incoherent to require a DNM-independent reason to be given 
to Agnes why she ought to be an agent rather than a shmagent before AoX may be held to be 
categorically binding on her. This is because Agnes cannot be a shmagent (who pursues 
purposes voluntarily that are not AoX-compliant) without being an agent (who pursues 
purposes voluntarily). By rejecting AoX, Agnes not only implies that she is not an agent, but 
also that she is not a shmagent. And, if she implies that she is not a shmagent by rejecting 
AoX, she cannot coherently claim that she may reject AoX because she is a shmagent. For 
this reason, given {AoX}(A), the question why Agnes ought to be an agent rather than a 
shmagent/ought to care whether or not she understands what it is for her to be an agent 
cannot arise coherently for her, whether the demand for a reason is a narrow internalist or a 
robust realist one, and this means that a categorical imperative just is a dialectically necessary 
maxim.  
 
The DNM and Internalism 
 
The DNM works with a broadly internalist view of reasons for action, in which a reason for 
Agnes to act must speak to Agnes’ reasoning. This is why it is conducted from Agnes’ 
internal viewpoint as an agent. 
But proponents of the DNM are not narrow internalists, because they do not offer 
agential self-understanding as a goal of action that agents necessarily have, but (in line with 
Kant’s maxims of the sensus communis) as a condition for Agnes to intelligibly attribute 
agent-individuating desires and choices to herself as reasons for her to act. They claim that 
Agnes can only think of herself as being subject to an hypothetical imperative (the only kind 
of imperative that narrow internalists recognise), on the basis of understanding what it is for 
her to be an agent, on which basis she ought to recognise that she ought to structure her 
practical thinking in accord with her dialectically necessary commitments. 
I anticipate that some will object that this is not how Gewirth argues for the PGC, 
because a widely accepted view is that he holds that Agnes must consider that she has the GR 
because she needs the GCAs (irrespective of her purposes) in order to act, i.e., because her 
GCAs are categorical instrumental needs of her agency (e.g., Bond 1980, pp. 50–51; 
Williams 1985, Chapter 4; and, surprisingly, Korsgaard 1996, pp. 133–34); on which basis 
the argument fails because Agnes does not have an instrumental need for Brian to have the 
GCAs regardless of her purposes. 
But this is not how Gewirth argues. His argument does not proceed from the narrow 
internalist “ought” in AoAA (an hypothetical imperative, requiring Agnes to defend her 
GCAs only if she is unwilling to accept generic damage to her ability to act) but from 
{AoAA}(A), where the operative “ought” is that Agnes unconditionally ought to conform her 
practical reasoning to AoAA because it is dialectically necessary for her to accept AoAA, this 
“because” not being a reason in narrow internalist terms. As should be clear from my 
presentation of the argument, the hypothetical “ought” AoAA plays no role in justifying the 
claim that dialectically necessary commitments are necessarily collectively universal. The 
fact that it is the PHI that is dialectically necessary for Agnes merely determines that her 
dialectically necessary commitments must be structured according to the will conception of 
rights, and her categorical instrumental need for the GCAs then requires these rights to be to 
the GCAs. It is the fact that Agnes’s commitment to the PHI is dialectically necessary that 
does the work. 
 
The DNM and Naturalism 
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When Gewirth (e.g., 1978, p. 102) says that his argument for the PGC derives “ought” from 
“is”, he does not claim to derive the PGC from the fact of Agnes’ agency, but that Agnes 
ought to accept the PGC from the fact that {PGC}A (Gewirth 1978, p. 158–159). Indeed, he 
claims that this fact constitutes Agnes being categorically bound to accept the PGC. And, as I 
have interpreted Kant, when he says that the moral law is given to agents as the fact of reason 
(or the sole fact of pure reason), the fact referred to is nothing other than that the CI’s 
categorical binding nature is constituted by the fact that {CI}A. 
Of course, if dialectically necessary commitments are necessarily collectively 
universal, then it is dialectically necessary for Agnes to hold that being an agent is the ratio 
essendi of the moral law/CI/PGC, i.e., that it is dialectally necessary for her to hold that it is 
because they are agents that agents are ends in themselves (whether in Kant’s or Gewirth’s 
interpretation of this), which is to say that it is dialectically necessary for Agnes to accept the 
naturalist thesis that “ought” can be derived from “is”. But this does not make “Agnes is an 
end in itself because she is an agent” a truth about the nature of agency, for this statement is 
justified as a requirement of Agnes’ agential self-understanding, not as a freestanding 
statement about the nature of agency (or her agency). If you like, Agnes must treat the 
statement “The fact that Z is an agent makes Z an end in itself” as a necessary truth only for 
the purpose of agential self-understanding. So, because the acceptance of normativity is 
constituted in agential self-understanding, it is a statement that is normatively required, not a 
normatively-neutral one. In this way, the naturalism the DNM supports is immune to the 
open-question argument. 
 
The DNM and Foundationalism 
 
Showing that, e.g., {M}(A&B) is intended to provide a foundation for all practical, not only 
moral, deliberation by rendering rationally impermissible all action not compliant with M by 
rendering scepticism about the categorically binding nature of M’s “ought” incoherent. 
However, Enoch considers that showing that {M}(A&B) is intended to “defeat the 
sceptic” (Enoch 2006, p. 182–185) by rendering scepticism about M’s “ought” logically 
impossible, which intention he claims is carried out on an adversarial model that requires the 
sceptic to operate on the constitutivist’s terms not those of the sceptic. 
However, to render scepticism rationally indefensible is distinct from rendering it 
logically impossible, because to deny that one is an agent is not to cease to be an agent. 
I surmise that Enoch’s characterisation of the anti-sceptical objectives of the DNM 
derives from his misattribution of narrow internalism to its proponents and/or to his failure to 
recognise the difference between analytic a priori and synthetic a priori (dialectically 
necessary) judgments. 
I also do not see how Enoch’s adversarial model applies to the DNM. This is because, 
from Agnes’ dialectically necessary perspective as an agent, the question why Brian ought to 
accept her normative claims does not arise. The only proper question is why Agnes ought to 
accept any normative claims. In the DNM, Agnes is both the protagonist (qua being an agent) 
and the sceptic (qua being the particular agent that she is) about normative claims, because of 
the biconditional relationship that exists between her view of herself as an agent and her view 
of herself as the particular agent that she is that operates within the standpoint of agential 
self-understanding. 
 
The DNM and Coherentism 
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Foundationalism is often contrasted with “coherentism”. Foundationalists try to derive 
conclusions logically/conceptually from premises that cannot be denied rationally or are 
alleged to be self-evidently true, whereas coherentists (who appeal to considerations like 
reflective equilibrium) merely aim to defend conclusions as being supported by premises that 
are widely accepted/deeply entrenched: the idea being to find principles that are supported by 
a wide range of deep commitments, with better accounts being those that are supported by a 
wider range of deeper commitments.  
However, the contrast between the DNM and “coherentism” is that the former 
operates only with dialectically necessary commitments, whereas the latter permits 
dialectically contingent inputs. Thus, the contrast between the DNM and “coherentism” is 
better portrayed as that between foundationalist-coherentism and non-foundationalist 
coherentism, or as that between coherentism that is not narrowly internalist and narrowly 
internalist coherentism.  
 
The DNM and Realism 
 
Per Enoch, the DNM is externalist because its broad internalism maintains that normative 
requirements, as strict requirements of agential self-understanding, do not rest on anything 
contingently connected to Agnes’ agency. But the DNM does not support “narrow 
externalism” (“robust realism”), the view that “there are non-natural normative truths that 
have an ontological status independent of agency” (Enoch 2006, p. 194–196) or the mere 
requirements of agential self-understanding (Enoch 2011, p. 229) (which may be considered 
to be foundational non-coherentism). 
 
Conclusion 
 
I have offered the DNM as an interpretation of what Kant considers to be a transcendental 
argument for a practical principle, and argued that if a practical precept can be shown to be 
dialectically necessary for agents then it is categorically binding on them. I have shown that 
David Enoch’s critique of constitutivism does not apply to the DNM because he (a) confuses 
the thesis that normativity is grounded in what constitutes agential self-understanding with 
the “constitutivist” thesis that it is grounded in understanding what constitutes agency; (b) 
fails to distinguish dialectically necessary requirements from analytic ones (thereby 
presupposing that there is no distinction between denying being an agent and not being an 
agent); and (c) does not distinguish narrow from broad internalism, so falsely associates the 
DNM with narrow internalism because it is not narrowly externalist. 
Objections against the DNM come from two main camps: narrow internalism and 
narrow externalism. Both raise the question, “Why should Agnes care whether or not she 
misunderstands what it is for her to be an agent?” But if Agnes has dialectically necessary 
commitments, this question does not arise coherently for her, because then for her to 
misunderstand what it is for her to be an agent is for her to imply that she is not an agent, on 
the basis of which she cannot coherently ask for any reason for her to act. 
In a later paper, Enoch says that he is willing to consider the viability of the thesis that 
we ought to care about self-understanding because “that’s just what it is to have a reason” 
(Enoch 2011, p. 229). This is ironic, because this is just what the thesis of the DNM is. Enoch 
has not shown, as he intends, that it is misguided to try to establish a CI on the basis of its 
dialectical necessity. 
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